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TALES OF DAMAGE AND (RETRO-) CAUSATION  
 
Stathis Banakas1 
 
‘Der Schadensersatz bezieht sich auf den Schaden. Ein nachteiliges Ereignis soll 
aus der Welt geschafft, soll wiedergutgemacht werden’2 
 
‘Why should we lay down temporal precedence as a defining property of a 
cause?’3 
 
I. Of Injuries and Damages in General 
1. What Injuries? 
When a person has suffered a physical damage, whether personal injury or 
property damage, all major European traditions of civil liability, including 
French, English and German tort law allow the recovery of all consequential 
expenses4. Such expenses include not only repair costs, consequential losses of 
profit and the like, but also, normally, all other costs that, in the circumstances, 
were reasonable for the victim to incur (for example, the cost of hiring a 
temporary substitute for a damaged chattel in order to mitigate the cost of its 
non-availability) . 
What amounts to physical damage is not, however, always clear. In the English 
case of Blue Circle Industries Plc v The Ministry of Defence5, Blue Circle ("BCL") 
owned some property, the Aldermaston Court Estate. It extended to some 137 
acres and included a listed Victorian Manor House, used as a hotel, and a 
modern office building, Portland House. They were set in attractive grounds 
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which included a large ornamental lake. The estate adjoined the Aldermaston 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) whose work at the relevant time 
included the research, design and production of nuclear devices for the 
Government. As a result of heavy rain, water from ponds on the AWE site 
overflowed onto the estate. A survey carried out by AWE personnel shortly 
thereafter revealed that a small area of marshland near the AWE boundary 
was contaminated by small quantities of radioactive matter (including 
plutonium), which, though not posing any threat to health, were above 
regulatory levels (under the Radioactive Sub- stances Act 1960). At the same 
time, BCL was conducting negotiations for the sale of the estate to Sun Micro-
Systems Ltd ("Sun") at a price of around £10m. Following the disclosure of the 
contamination, Sun ceased its interest in the site and the estate remained 
unsold. AWE accepted responsibility to pay for the removal of contaminated 
material (at a cost of nearly £350,000), but denied liability for any further costs 
or for the effect of the incident on the saleability or value of the property. BCL 
presented to the court a claim founded on the statutory cause of action 
provided by s. 12 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or, alternatively, on 
nuisance or the rule of so-called strict liability for dangerous escapes in Rylands 
v Fletcher. Liability under the Act turned on whether the necessary “damage to 
property” required by s. 7(1) of the Act of 1965 to engage the liability of the 
defendants meant only physical damage to tangible property or also extended 
to cover pure economic loss or damage to incorporeal property or property 
rights. In an earlier case of a claim under the Act for contamination, the case of 
Merlin v British Nuclear Fuels plc6, Gatehouse J had held that the mere 
presence within the plaintiffs' property of emitting radionuclides emanating 
from waste discharge which cause no physical damage to the fabric of the 
property, could not on its own constitute such damage and any diminution in 
the value of the property caused by their presence was accordingly pure 
economic loss. That case concerned a claim by plaintiffs whose house had 
allegedly been contaminated by radionuclides emanating from the notorious 
British Nuclear Fuel's plant at Sellafield. They had moved in order to avoid 
exposing their children to a health risk but were unable to sell the property 
except at a much reduced price. Their claim failed on the basis that 
contamination of the air space within a building was not damage to property. 
The judge said that the plaintiffs’ argument that “property” included the air 
space within the walls, ceilings and floors of the house and that this was, 
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therefore, damaged by the presence of radionuclides and, as a result, became 
less valuable as the family's home, seemed to him to be ‘too far-fetched’. 
Another case, Hunter v LDDC,7 concerned Common Law claims for damages, 
arising from the deposit of dust on the plaintiff's house, during the 
construction of a new road. The Court of Appeal had to determine as a 
preliminary issue whether such deposits were capable of constituting damage 
to property. Interesting is the judgment of Pill LJ (with whom the other 
members of the Court agreed) who said8: “In my judgment the deposit of dust 
is capable of giving rise to an action in negligence. Whether it does depends on 
proof of physical damage and that depends on the evidence and the 
circumstances. Dust is an inevitable incident of urban life and the claim arises 
on the assumption that the defendants have caused excessive deposits. 
Reasonable conduct and a reasonable amount of cleaning to limit the ill effects 
of dust can be expected of householders. Subject to that, if, for example, in 
ordinary use the excessive deposit is trodden into the fabric of a carpet by 
householders in such a way as to lessen the value of the fabric, an action 
would lie. Similarly, if it follows from the effects of excessive dust on the fabric 
that professional cleaning of the fabric is reasonably required, the cost is 
actionable and if the fabric is diminished by the cleaning that too would 
constitute damage. Excessive dust might also be shown to have damaged 
electrical apparatus and there could no doubt be many other examples. The 
damage is in the physical change which renders the article less useful or less 
valuable. On the assumptions we are invited to make, that rather than any 
general concept of loss of utility is the appropriate test”. After considering 
these cases, Carnwath J in Blue Circle Industries Plc v The Ministry of Defence9 
was in no doubt that the case fell on the "physical damage" side of the line, 
accepting Pill LJ’s finding that the damage is in the physical change which 
renders the property less useful or less valuable. The judge also considered the 
leading cases of Murphy v Brentwood D.C.10, and Invercargill City Council v 
Hamlin11. Murphy decided that the duty of care in the tort of negligence is 
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concerned with safety from physical injury, whether to persons or property, 
and neither the protection of property rights as such, nor, indeed, the 
compensation of pure economic losses. It follows that the cost of repair of 
defective property (provided the defect was discovered before any injury was 
done), as well as the loss from the diminution of its value are not recoverable 
in negligence. This applies not only to subsequent purchasers of defectively 
built premises (in the case of which it must, of course, be accepted that their 
property rights were instituted on an already damaged object), but also to the 
building owner, subject to the caveat that the latter may have a claim against 
the builder in negligence for repair or demolition costs of buildings that create 
a danger of physical injury on neighbouring land or on the highway. In the 
culture of English tort law it is the nature of the injury, rather than the legal 
right infringed, that matters. And it is only “physical” or “property” damage 
that can be compensated in an action in negligence, not a merely “economic” 
one12. Murphy also established that if the defect is discovered before there is 
any injury to health or damage to property, the cost incurred by a subsequent 
purchaser in putting the defect right is pure economic loss and is not claimable 
in negligence13. But, interestingly, the Blue Circle Industries case presented the 
judge with the additional, more difficult question, whether it mattered that the 
difference in value of the property was partly attributable to the general fall in 
rental values in England between January 1993 and December 1994, rather 
than the contamination itself. On this point, he found direct assistance in 
another New Zealand case, McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd14 . In 
that case, a solicitor negligently failed to ensure that a lease granted by his 
developer client contained a guarantee from the lessee's parent company. The 
result was that the developer, who had intended to sell the property with the 
benefit of the lease soon after completion, found himself in dispute with the 
parent company and was unable to market the property for more than two 
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years, during which time the market fell. The New Zealand Court of Appeal 
held that the developer was entitled to the difference between what the 
property would have fetched if sold soon after its completion with a 
guaranteed lease and what it eventually fetched two years later. In the light of 
that case, Carnwath J in Blue Circle Industries Plc held that the disclosure of the 
contamination in January 1993 produced a situation in which BCL, in a period 
of falling property values, were unable to market the property until remedial 
works were complete. That was a foreseeable consequence of the 
contamination and AWE were responsible for it. In arriving at this conclusion, 
the learned judge is responsible for the only remarkable development in 
England after Murphy, divorcing himself from the restrictive philosophy of the 
House of Lords and justifiably extending the legal notion of property damage 
to allow the compensation in tort of the loss of value caused by negligent 
direct physical interference with the property. 
It is also interesting to have a look at what is considered by the courts to be a 
property damage in German law. It is often said by German writers that a pure 
infringement of a property right, culpable and unlawful, is actionable and ensuing 
actual damage will be compensated under paragraph 823, section I, of the German 
Civil Code. Like in English law, however, only the subject of the proprietary right 
himself can sue, not a third party suffering consequential loss. There is also no 
doubt that the theft or damage to the substance of the object of the proprietary 
right is actionable. But, again like English law, German law provides no remedy for 
a negligently caused pure loss of market value of property without any physical 
damage to it15. And the physical damage must, of course, have been caused after 
the proprietary interest of the plaintiff on the property was established; thus, the 
cases of original latent structural defects, like the English case of Murphy, are easily 
distinguished from cases of subsequent defective alterations or extensions16. 
Where German law appears possibly more generous than Anglo-American law is 
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in relation to the loss of use of (undamaged) property. Provided that the property 
cannot be used by anybody (i.e. not only the owner or possessor) and, also, that it 
cannot be used at all, there can be an action under 823, I17.  
 
The English and the German systems, in particular, are progressively moving 
closer to one another in their attitude that the recovery of losses caused by the 
invasion of physical interests is almost "axiomatic"18, has a "normative" 
character and does not always depend on actual proof that the costs had 
already occurred on the day of the trial. This attitude was more naturally 
formed in the Common Law tradition; while behind the German conversion to 
it can be found a remarkable case of doctrinal transplantation of a Common 
Law conception, of great interest to Comparative law. German law has, in the 
“normative concept of damage”, endorsed an idea similar to the Common Law 
idea of an action for damages as a vindicative remedy of a right 
(‘Rechtsverfolgende Natur des Schadensersatzes’). 
More specifically, the English law of torts has a tradition of so-called “torts 
actionable per se”19. Because the action for damages used to serve, in the past, 
also the purpose of testing out the existence of a right; in such cases, the 
presence of actual harm was not always necessary for the plaintiff to be able to 
sue. In the Tort of Negligence, however, only actual harm is compensated20. 
But with their practice of “general damages” awards, English courts have 
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allowed themselves considerable space for normative manoeuvring. It is often 
the case that such awards go far be- yond the monetary value of the actual 
harm suffered. The usefulness of this practice becomes only too evident with 
novel types of injury: if the courts feel that they are fit for compensation, the 
mechanism is there to accommodate them. In Germany, it is often argued that 
the German Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB), apparently under 
the strong influence of Mommsen21, endorsed a strictly factual, “materialistic” 
concept of damage. This is considered to be the philosophy behind the 
principle of non-compensation of so- called “non-material” losses (§ 253 
BGB)22. But the comparative work of Neuner in the 1930s, and several other 
German scholars more recently, created a theoretical movement in favour of 
revising the orthodoxy of this view. Neuner’s “normative theory” of damage 
was directly inspired by the old Common Law tradition of using the tortious 
action as a test ground for the existence of a right; Neuner called this the 
“rechtsverfolgende Funktion” of the action for damages. Neuner became, in 
this way, the apostle of a new faith that has proved for Mommsen’s 
intellectual disciples hard to resist in the decades following his seminal article 
in the “Archiv für die civilistische Praxis”23. Neuner’s work and its effect on the 
evolution of German doctrine and jurisprudence provide a rare and striking 
example of the transplantation not merely of a principle or a doctrine, but of a 
whole tradition from a legal system with a highly individual experimental style 
into a legal system of the highest dogmatic sophistication. The transplantation 
becomes even more noteworthy if one considers that the tradition in question 
was, at the time of its initiation in Germany, rapidly declining in England, so 
that it is today only of peripheral importance. From the “rechtsverfolgende 
Funktion” of the tortious action Neuner concluded that the concept of 
“damage” itself has to be a “normative” concept. The law should be left free to 
work out its own concept of damage for its own purposes. Assessment of 
damages should, furthermore, be made on the objective basis of the “common 
value” of the perished interest (“gemeiner Wert”), rather than on the basis of 
its subjective value. The latter was another postulate of the traditional 
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Mommsenian concept of damage. Neuner’s ideas were further developed by 
several other authors; among others, led by Bydlinski (he calls the award of 
damages “a sanction for the injured interest or good”)24 and Larenz (who 
introduced the idea of a “Rechtsfortsetzungsfunktion” of the action for 
damages)25. 
  
2. The Causal Link 
Proof of sufficient causal link is normally required by every modern tort system 
as a necessary condition of liability; a postulate of the principle of personal 
responsibility. The causal connection is preferable to any other, such as, for 
instance, a spatio-temporal one26. 
A great deal of ink has been spilt on the question of the proper criterion of 
legal causation. Apart from the self-evident fact (about which all tort laws 
using the causal explanation cannot but agree) that the defendant's conduct 
must be at least a condition “sine qua non” of the harm complained of, there 
appears to exist a healthy diversity in modern tort laws as to the criteria of 
“legal” causation that the courts apply next. 
In French law, for example, it is commonly accepted in the context of art. 1240 
f. of the Code Civil that a “direct” causal link must exist between the 
defendant's conduct and the damage. The exact meaning of this (unwritten, 
but apparently indisputable) rule, is not very clear27. It cannot mean that the 
defendant’s conduct must be the sole condition of the harm, because this 
would be defining liability too narrowly. It has been suggested that whenever 
there is an independent or subsequent condition of the harm, other than the 
defendant’s conduct, with a special “explanatory” force (e.g. may be 
considered “abnormal” under the circumstances), then the defendant’s 
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conduct ceases to be a “direct” cause of the harm28. Another view is that only 
“necessary” consequences are “direct” consequences, but this hardly explains 
anything29. It is, on the other hand, noteworthy that “foreseeability”, so 
important a criterion in Common Law and, also, of central importance in 
German law, too, has been described as “une idée directrice” for the judge in 
this connection30.  Some French decisions have actually turned to a test of legal 
causation similar to the German “adequacy” test31. Of special interest is, also, 
another interpretation of “directness”, which relates the causation rule to the 
legal notion of fault: the more serious the defendant’s fault, the more “direct” 
its consequences. If the fault is extremely serious, e.g. malice, the defendant 
must account for virtually all harmful consequences. Marteau, who first 
advanced this view more than a century ago,32 may have been influenced by 
the treatment of serious fault in other legal systems. In Common Law, for 
example, there is a well-established principle, according to which “intended 
consequences” are “never too remote”33, and in German law wrongful 
intention receives a similarly harsh treatment34. Marteau considered the 
defendant’s fault to be the most important factor to influence the judge’s mind 
as to the imputability of certain consequences; he believed that: «la formule 
du dommage indirect est une fausse étiquette qui sert à designer le jus 
moderandi du juge français»35. 
But three objections were advanced against this:36 Firstly, it has been noted 
that a similar distinction between intentional and non-intentional 
consequences is not made in the field of contractual liability (art. 1151 C.C.), 
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the damage is only pecuniary (contrary to what appears to be the general causation rule in negligence, 
regarding the extent of liability for pecuniary damage). 
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Hoffmann, “Causation”, 121 Law Quarterly Review 2003, 592-603, on which more  infra. 
36 Mazeaud/Mazeaud, Traite, Vol. II, 6th ed, No. 1672. 
where, besides, “directness” itself, as a criterion of causation, originated. 
Secondly, it has been observed that the very idea of a moderating power of the 
judge in awarding damages is contrary to the wishes of the authors of the Code 
Civil, as revealed in the record of its “motives”. Thirdly, since the application of 
the principle of directness affects the legal issue of causation, it is subjected to 
the control of the French Civil Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation; a “jus 
moderandi”, belonging to the sovereign power of the trial judge, would make 
this control virtually impossible. 
It is submitted, however, that Marteau’s observations are not entirely devoid of 
truth. In an oblique way the French judge has, in fact, been given a certain “jus 
moderandi” i.e. by being granted, in practice, an effective discretion in the actual 
assessment of damages. And the courts cannot but be influenced by the degree 
of fault involved when deciding the issue of “directness”. «On donne une idée 
assez juste de la jurisprudence, en disant qu'elle s'attache à une causalité morale 
plutôt que matérielle»37. 
 
The influence of the degree of fault is, besides, no less in the context of an 
“adequacy” theory of causation relating the “generally foreseeable” harm (the 
commonest criterion of “adequacy”) to the type of harm of which the 
defendant’s conduct significantly increased the probability. This version of the 
“adequacy” theory has been criticized, too, for confusing fault and causation38. 
But in the case of non-premeditated harm39 it is often likely that a serious 
amount of carelessness will have a stronger explanatory force, no matter how 
objectively the “adequate” cause is defined; this is not a confusion of fault and 
causation, but a reflection of the fact that a causation theory based on 
probability cannot but take into account the degree to which seriousness of fault 
and probability of harm are in proportion. 
In German law, the conditio sine qua non test is coupled with a test of “adequate 
cause”, whose correctional intervention is meant to avert an intolerable 
expansion of liability. The most common version of the “adequacy” theory 
employs a test according to which a condition of the harm may be considered 
as a causa adequata, when it has increased the objective probability of the 
harm. The significance of a condition is considered ex post facto (forecast with 
hindsight: in German “nachträgliche Prognose”). It is, moreover, the “hindsight” 
of a most prudent and perceptive observer that is to be taken into account, and 
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the calculation of harm-probability is done in the light of “all the knowledge of 
laws and generalizations” available to mankind40. This formula has run into 
difficulties in practice, especially in connection with certain types of 
consequential losses (e.g. ulterior harm)41. 
 
The Common Law causation test of “reasonable foreseeability” has strong 
similarities with the German “adequacy” test42. For example it has been held 
that foreseeability is determined in the light of the knowledge of the 
“reasonable” man after the act43. Proof of foreseeability is an absolutely 
necessary condition for a claim to be accepted in negligence in Anglo-American 
law. If the harm is not shown to be foreseeable “in kind”, then there is no 
question of recovery, even if it can be shown to be “direct”44. On the other hand, 
a physical loss that is shown to have been foreseeable, may be recoverable, 
albeit “indirect”45. In German law, too, it seems that physical losses, if they can 
be taken to be among the objectively foreseeable consequences of the harmful 
event, are recoverable, even when they appear to be “indirect”46. 
 
 
II. The Special Problem of Expenditure to Prevent Anticipated Physical Damage 
(“Vorsorgekosten”)47  
 
1. A Philosophical Challenge 
 
As elegantly put by Erwin Deutsch, “Compensation is for harm: a harmful event 
has occurred in the world, and the harm should be made good”48. The question 
may be asked, however, whether the law should not also contemplate the 
acceptability of the recovery of expenses towards mitigating or totally averting 
a damage that has not yet materialized but is strongly anticipated. The law 
                                                          
40 For the adequacy theory used in Germany see the classic account of Deutsch, Haftungsrecht, Vol. I, 1976, p. 146 f.; see also 
Honore, IntEncCompL XI, ch. 7, p. 49 f., for a general discussion of “probability” theories of causation, of which the adequacy 
theory is by far the most important. 
41 Honore, op. cit., p. 54. 
42 See Banakas, S., ‘Causalité juridique et imputation: réflexions sur quelques développements récents en droit anglais’, Revue 
Lamy Droit Civil, Suppl. au No 40, July/August 2007, 93 
43 See the analysis in Dias [1967] CLJ 62, 68, 77Ä82. 
44 Since The Wagon Mound (No 1) [l961] AC 388, the House of Lords has held that if the damage is foreseeable in kind neither 
the unforeseeable extent of the injury nor the unforeseeable manner of its incidence can absolve the defendant: see Smith v 
Leech Brain & Co., Ltd., [1962] 2 QB 405; Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837. These principles apply only to physical 
loss, i.e. injury to person or property. 
45 As has been illustrated by the House of Lords decision in the case of Dorset Yacht Ltd. v Home Office [1970] AC 1004: see 
the remarks of Lord Denning M.R. in S.C.M. v W.J. Whittall & Son, Ltd [1971] I QB 337, 43. 
46 See BGHZ 41,123. 
47 See H. Lange/G. Schiemann/J. Gernhuber, Schadensersatz: Handbuch Des Schuldrechts, 2003, p. 295 w. f. r. There is no 
specialist literature dedicated to this problem in English law. 
48 Erwin Deutsch, “Der Ersatz reiner Vermoegensschaden nach deutschem Recht”; Banakas, E.K. (ed), Civil Liability For 
Pure Economic Loss, 1996, p. 73 (translated by Tony Weir). 
generally recognises not only the right to self defence (a valid defence under 
most tort systems) but also a duty to mitigate the loss ex post facto. It would 
appear quite reasonable, in view of the existence of such a duty, to recognise 
the recoverability of mitigation expenses made ex ante49. The issue is not easy 
to decide. Let us consider some examples. 
 
A bus company keeps stand-by buses for quick replacement of any vehicles that 
might be accidentally damaged. An enterprise incurs special overhead expenses 
towards establishing a mechanism for preventing and/or putting right any 
damage or break down that might occur and affect business interests. A 
supermarket appoints special security staff to prevent shoplifting50. The 
television licensing authority spends money to put in place a mechanism to 
collect license dues from unwilling users51. The musicians’ guilt charges a 
subscription to a copyright protection agency hunting copyright violators52. 
When the damage finally materializes, can these precautionary costs be 
recovered from a tortfeasor, whose anticipated wrongful act caused such 
expenditure to be incurred in advance of the tortious act? 
 
The technical problem at issue here appears to be the following: to what extent 
expenses incurred in mitigation or aversion of an anticipated damage, likely to 
be caused by a strongly anticipated harmful event, may be seen as having been 
“caused” by the subsequent materialization of the harmful event? 
 
This problem is a well-known philosophical problem that has received the 
following general formulation: “Can an Effect ever Precede its Cause?”53, also 
known as the problem of retro-causation or backward causation. This is what 
one of the outstanding philosophers of our time, the late Professor Michael 
Dummett, has written on the issue: 
 
“We may observe that the occurrence of an event of a certain kind is a sufficient 
condition for the previous occurrence of an event of another kind; and, having 
                                                          
49 See with further references, Looschelders, Dirk, Die Mitverantwortlichkeit des Geschadigten im Privatrecht 
(Jus Privatum) 1999, Mohr Siebeck, p. 496 f 
50 See e.g. BGHZ 75, 230, 234, commented with approval by Erwin Deutsch in JZ 1980, 99 f., denying recovery of such 
precautionary expenditure; cf similarly, LG München DAR 1988, 383. Further references and discussion of the (negative) 
literature in Lange,H  and Schiemann, G., Schadensersatz (Handbuch Des Schuldrechts), 3rd ed.,2003, Mohr Siebeck, p. 387 
f, 
51 Recovery allowed in BGHZ 75, 238; for some reason the issue, which was quite popular in German literature in the 1970s 
has not been much discussed recently in Germany. For interesting comparisons with Swiss case law and an assessment of 
German case law see Honsell, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Besonderer Teil, 6th ed. 2001, para. 11 IV 2. 
52 See the favorable decisions of the Federal Supreme Court for GEMA, the music authors’ society, BGHZ 17, 376, 383 and 
BGHZ 59, 286; Löwenheim, Schadensersatz in doppelter Höhe der Lizenzgebühr bei Urheberrechstverletzung?, JZ 1992, 12 
f.; also the detailed analysis, and evaluation of the hostile literature, in Lange,H  and Schiemann, G., Schadensersatz 
(Handbuch Des Schuldrechts), 3rd ed.,2003, Mohr Siebeck, at p. 297 f. 
53 Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978, p. 319 f. 
observed this, we might, under certain conditions, offer the occurrence of the 
latter event, not indeed as a causal, but as a quasi-causal explanation of the 
occurrence of the earlier. There are three such conditions that have to be 
fulfilled if it were to be reasonable to offer such a quasi-causal explanation. First, 
the occurrence of the earlier event, which was to be explained by reference to 
that of the latter event, would have to be incapable, so far as we could judge, of 
being (causally) explained by reference to simultaneous or preceding events; 
there must be no discoverable explanation of the earlier event which did not 
refer to the latter. Secondly, there would have to be reason for thinking that the 
two events were not causally connected, i.e. there must be no discoverable way 
of representing the earlier event as a causal antecedent (a remote cause) of the 
latter. Thirdly, we should have to be able to give a satisfactory (causal) account 
of the occurrence of the latter event which contained no reference to the 
occurrence of the earlier. If these three conditions were fulfilled, and there 
really was good evidence of the repeated concomitance of the two events, then 
the quasi-causal connection between them would be a fact of nature which we 
could do no more than observe and record.”54 
 
In the light of these three conditions of Professor Dummett, expenses in 
mitigation or aversion of anticipated harm come very close to qualifying as 
“quasi-consequential” losses upon the (subsequent) damage (if and when the 
latter finally occurs). But it appears that the first condition demands proof that 
the expenses were inescapably necessitated, in the light of all circumstances, by 
the kind and scope of the anticipated damage to the extent that they might be 
seen, at the time of their occurrence, as virtually “forced” upon the will of the 
plaintiff. Can this, if true, ever be the case in practice? 
 
Be that as it may, it is probable that courts are likely to indulge less in technical 
causation issues and more in broader considerations of policy, to the extent that 
this is allowed to them. Indeed, the issue has arisen as a concrete problem in 
the German law of damages, in the form of so-called precautionary expenditure 
and costs of averting or mitigating an anticipated loss55. The anticipated loss 
itself will be the product of an unlawful act, which the advance expenditure is 
                                                          
54 ibid., p. 322 f. See also the philosophical debate ignited by Dummett’s views and the criticisms of Flew in Dummett, A.E., 
in Dummett, A.E and Flew, A. ‘Symposium: Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 28, Belief and Will (1954), pp. 27-62; a good summary of the philosophical 
debate on these issues can be found in ‘Backward Causation’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/ (last visited 26.01.2017) 
55 On the problem of the recoverability of expenses made in advance of the harmful event in order to avert it or mitigate its 
effect see Lange,H  and Schiemann, G., Schadensersatz (Handbuch Des Schuldrechts), 3rd ed.,2003.p. 385 with further 
references; also from the original literature in Germany Hagmann, Die Schadensersatzrechtliche Behandlung Von 
Vorsorgemaßnahmen,, Diss., Tuebingen 1976; von Marschall in Fs Max Rheinstein, Vol. II, 1969, 625; Schmidt, JZ 1974, 73 
f.; Klimke, NJW 1974, 81 f.; Canaris, NJW 1974, 521; Musielack, JuS 1977, 531. 
intended to prevent: for example, the cost of hiring security personnel to guard 
the premises of a supermarket from acts of theft. And the person from whom 
the advance expenditure will be claimed will be anyone found liable for such an 
anticipated unlawful act, which in their case the expenditure, obviously, 
eventually failed to prevent. 
 
German courts seem to have adopted a rather negative position in connection 
with such expenditure, when such costs not exceed normal, day to day, 
overhead expenditure. But, exceptionally, when, under the circumstances, 
established standards of legal policy, like the principle of “Treu und Glauben”, 
dictate otherwise, such advance expenditure may be recoverable from the 
defendant who is liable for the main delictual act56. 
 
In France considerations of legal policy find more space in the broadness of the 
liability and compensation principles of the general clauses. This is illustrated by 
a decision of a lower court in a case where the Electricity Board of France sought 
the recovery of costs, towards maintaining and putting into operation stand by 
repair units, from the party responsible for damage to a power cable. The first 
instance court found that these costs represented no actual harm; they had 
been “otherwise” indemnified, i.e. mainly in the price of electricity, where all 
“overheads” of the Board were also reflected. But the Cour de Cassation thought 
that the Board ought to be allowed to recover those costs on the grounds of the 
principle of “réparation intégrale”57. This implies that the Cour de Cassation 
accepted not only that the expenses represented “actual harm”, but that they 
were also causally connected with the harmful event in anticipation of which 
they had been incurred. 
 
The French scholar, Philippe Le Tourneau applauded the recoverability of 
expenses towards averting or mitigating a damage from the person responsible 
for that damage on the grounds that, otherwise, “the spirit of initiative and 
enterprise, profitable to the community, would be discouraged”58. The issue of 
causation, however, should not be so lightly dismissed. Personal liability, 
whether based on fault or not (i.e. “strict liability”), cannot and should not be 
extended beyond events for which the harmful event is, at least, a cause. If “to 
award compensation without fault” has now come to be regarded by some 
distinguished lawyers as liable to “make society bankrupt”59, what can one say 
on the implications of “compensation without causation”. But is there any 
                                                          
56 See BGHZ 32, 280; BGH JZ 1961, 420; and supra, notes 24, 25. 
57 Dalloz Sirey 1976 J. 137 note Le Tourneau; see also Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 1975, 106 obs. Durry. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Denning (Lord), The Discipline of Law, 1979, p. 280; compare von Caemmerer in RabelsZ 42, 5 f. (1978). 
evidence of causation in such cases? 
 
Let us take a closer look: the compensation of such advance expenditure raises 
three major issues: 
 
The first is, can the posterior unlawful act be seen as the cause of the 
expenditure? Professor Dummett’s three conditions above ought to be satisfied 
for this to be the case. It seems that, on face-value, these three conditions are 
satisfied: First, the occurrence of the earlier event, the advance expenditure, is 
incapable of being (causally) explained by reference to simultaneous or 
preceding events; there must be no discoverable explanation of the earlier 
event which did not refer to the latter. Provided, of course, that the advance 
precautionary (security) expenditure has been exclusively caused by an 
anticipated unlawful act, such as that of the defendant, and no other event, such 
as, for example, health and safety or public relations. Second, there can be no 
reason for thinking that the two events were not causally connected, i.e. there 
is no discoverable way of representing the prior expenditure as a causal 
antecedent (a remote cause) of the unlawful act: surely, the theft is not in any 
way caused by the advance security measures. This, however, will not be the 
case, obviously, if, on the facts, security measures have in any way precipitated 
the subsequent theft, for example, by making possible a particular way of 
carrying it out and the like. Third, there certainly is a satisfactory (causal) 
account of the occurrence of the latter event which contains no reference to the 
occurrence of the earlier: the defendant’s fault in committing the unlawful act. 
Additionally, as Dummett would require, the repeated concomitance of the two 
events, advance security expenditure and subsequent thefts is evident. This 
according to Dummett should lead us to accept a quasi-causal connection 
between them as “a fact of nature”. But a paradox here is that advance 
precautionary security expenditure is, of course, intended to prevent the 
subsequent unlawful act from happening; indeed, if security works, that should 
be the case. If it doesn’t work and a theft takes place, could it be considered as 
a net loss for the claimant (see below)? 
 
A second issue is that clearly only a proportion of the advance precautionary 
security expenditure can be clearly attributed to the subsequent unlawful act, 
unless, of course, the measure was an ad hoc advance precaution against an 
identified single threat. This raises issues of probability and of magnitude of 
anticipated risk and assessment of advance costs attributable to each 
subsequent unlawful act, because such an act is as much the cause of the prior 
expenditure as any other subsequent unlawful act that was committed on the 
same premises, indeed, also any other attempted unlawful act thwarted by the 
prior expenditure. 
 
A third issue, related to the second, is avoiding the overcompensating of the 
claimant, whose prior expenditure may have thwarted other subsequent 
unlawful acts; if the defendant should compensate a portion of the expenditure, 
assessment must take this into account. 
 
A fourth issue is that a distinction needs to be made between precautionary 
expenditure caused by the threat of, and aiming at, preventing the subsequent 
unlawful act and other precautionary expenditure, for example, of an 
indemnificatory nature, such as loss or accident insurance. Last, but not least, 
comes the issue of the degree to which precautionary expenditure is the result 
of the exercise of the claimant’s own free will, which is, unlike actual damage 
caused by the injurer, voluntary expenditure. This has been a major obstacle in 
actual case law in several European jurisdictions60. 
 
Regardless of the logical coherence of the above, calculating the defendant’s 
liability for prior precautionary expenditure by the claimant may be practically 
difficult, if not impossible, and will depend on the extent to which statistical 
evidence may persuade a court of law. Unless, of course, one is prepared to see 
the defendant’s liability for such expenditure as being at large, i.e. in the form 
of general, normative damages that a court of law can award without need of 
concrete calculation of the extent of pecuniary loss. 
 
 
2. Getting Real about Legal Causation 
 
“[The] causal-set model does not imply any chronological relationship among 
the causal elements involved, although all causes must precede the plaintiff’s 
harm”61. 
 
This blunt statement, combined with the need to test causation on the so-called 
counter-factual inquiry test, would immediately appear to shut the door to any 
speculation on precautionary expenditure qualifying as harm caused by 
subsequent wrongful activity. It must be made clear that the need for the 
“effect” to follow the “cause”, and not the inverse, is unanimously accepted by 
                                                          
60 See the analysis of Heinrich Honsell, FS 
 für Peter Schlechtriem Zum 70. Geburtstag (edited by Schwenzer, I.,/Schlechtriem, P./Hager, G.), 2003, S. 750 f. 
61 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability For Physical Harm – Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005, Chapter 5, 
Para. 26 Factual Cause, p. 420 (italics added). 
both lawyers and scientists as a self-evident requirement of legal causation62. As 
put by an eminent scientist, writing on the environment, epidemiology and 
disease, the first important question always is: “Is the temporal relationship 
correct?”63 
 
Be that as it may, legal causation cannot but be also based on the indisputable 
complexity of natural causation64, famously described by John Stuart Mill as 
follows: 
 
“The cause then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions 
positive and negative taken together; the whole of the conditions of every 
description, which being realized, the consequence invariably follows.”65
 
 
The fact that precautionary advance expenditure may have (also) been caused 
by other events, e.g. increase of business competitiveness, greater cost-
effectiveness and the like, should be no obstacle, as tort theory traditionally 
accepts that the tortfeasor’s conduct does not need to be the sole cause of the 
claimant’s loss, acknowledging the simple scientific proposition that 
 
“…there can never be a single cause of an event. A very complex set of 
circumstances must be present for any effect to occur.”66 
 
While the affirmation that “all causes must precede the plaintiff’s harm” smacks 
of dogmatism that seems to beg the question, the counter-factual inquiry test, 
in particular, would immediately point to the fact that such advance expenditure 
could not have possibly be caused by this particular defendant’s subsequent act, 
since absent this defendant’s specific act such precautionary expenditure would 
still have occurred. However, counter-factual inquiry also shows that absent all 
                                                          
62 A good review of English and US developments on legal causation is Stapleton, “Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability 
for Consequences”, 119 Law Quarterly Review 2003, 388-425. 
63 Austin Bradford Hill, “The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?”, 58 Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 295 (1965). 
64 Unless, of course, one has the authority, and, dare I say, audacity of a judge of the stature of Lord Hoffmann, who boldly 
declared that “There is nothing special or mysterious about the law of causation. One decides, as a matter of law, what causal 
connection the law requires and one then decides, as a question of fact, whether the claimant has satisfied the requirements of 
the law. There is, in my opinion, nothing more to be said”, in Leonard Hoffmann, “Causation”, 121 Law Quarterly Review 
2003, 592-603. This “common sense” approach of the House of Lords reached an apogee of unscientific “policy” trickery in 
the causation area in the case of Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134: see more in my paper “Causalité 
juridique et imputation: réflexions sur quelques développements récents en droit anglais”, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, Suppl. au 
No 40, July/August 2007, 93-99. 
65 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative And Inductive, 1843, ch. V para. 3, ch. VIII para. 1-4; for a modern 
endorsement of Mill’s view of causation in a so-called necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) test see Wright, R. 
V.,“Causation in Tort Law”, 73 California Law Review 1735 (1985): the NESS test is primarily intended to address the problem 
of duplicative or preemptive causes, which, however, is outside the scope of the present study. 
66 Fischer, D. A., “Causation in Fact in Omission cases”, 1992 Utah Law Review 1335, 1338; Stapleton, in “Legal Cause: 
Cause-in-fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences”, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 941, 958-961 (2001), refers to Chaos 
theory to support a similar view. 
future wrongful acts that are statistically probable, the precautionary 
expenditure would, indeed, not have occurred. Can this help, if one takes into 
account other examples of cases where tort law has found it possible to accept 
the defendant’s liability although the claimant could not establish factual 
causation against him specifically, but could only infer such factual causation 
against a group of persons to which the defendant belonged? In the UK, the 
House of Lords accepted such liability without proof of individual causation in 
the case of death caused by an employee’s exposure to asbestos67. Also, so-
called “market-share” liability in US law68 may have a surprising potential of 
application in cases of precautionary expenditure, applicable, although 
necessarily in reverse chronological order, to cases of advance security 
expenditure been charged in a similar way to those that share the lucrative 
market of criminal activity. And this would be more in accordance with so-called 
normative economics theory (deterrence), as it would encourage the efficient 
prevention of tortious activity at the expense of the tortfeasor rather than any 
corrective-justice approach. 
 
Dummett’s logical/empirical approach to temporarily inverse natural causation 
could be not too far from the reality of advance precautionary expenditure 
imposed on the claimant by the strong probability of the defendant’s wrongful 
act. True, this expenditure is the result of the claimant’s exercise of her own free 
will and freedom of choice. Unfortunately, English law is not very clear on the 
conditions under which a person may be liable to another for the latter’s 
voluntary (self-inflicted) loss69. EU Civil liability law, on the other hand, is clearer 
                                                          
67 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22; restricted to mesothelioma cases by the Compensation Act 
2006, s. 3. Related issues of great interest include the status of epidemiological evidence when factual causation is not 
possible; see for example the judgment of Swift J. in Jeffrey Jones and others -v- The Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change and Coal Products Limited [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB) and further discussion in Banakas, S., ‘Causalité 
juridique et imputation: réflexions sur quelques développements récents en droit anglais’, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, Suppl. au 
No 40, July/August 2007, 93 
68 US case law on ‘market share liability , which began with the Californian case of Sindell v Abbot Labs. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 2, 
607 P. 2d 924 (Cal 1980), is reviewed comprehensively in Twerski, A. D.,  “Market Share- A Tale of Two Centuries”, 55 
Brooklyn Law Review 869 (1989); Rostron, A.,  “Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for 
Non Fungible Products”, UCLA Law Review 2004, 151; see also Wright, R. W., “Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, 
Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility”, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 1071 (2001). Market share liability 
is different than the joint and several liability recognized in Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts known as 
concerted action theory. Market share liability also must not be confused with so-called ‘alternative liability’, known since the 
time of the Roman lex aquilia, (see the famous US case of Summers v. Tice 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), in which two 
members of a hunting party simultaneously fired their guns in the same direction, and the plaintiff was shot in the eye and lip, 
but determining which of the two hunters had shot him was not possible: the California Supreme Court held that the burden 
of proof on the plaintiff was nevertheless discharged, and it was on either defendant to prove that the shot fired by him was 
not the cause). But market share liability is close to  enterprise liability for defective products, recognized in  Hall v. E.L 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, US Dist. Court, ED New York (1972), also endorsed by the UK House of Lords 
on a different reasoning in Fairchild (above note 67). 
69 See in a context totally different than the one discussed in this paper, Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd, 2008 WL 371099 (HL), 
[2008] 2 All E.R. 943, [2008], in which the House of Lords held that a company was liable to the widow for damages under 
the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 s. 1 in respect of the financial loss attributable to the suicide of her late husband, employed by 
the company as a maintenance engineer. He had been struck on the head by a machine he was working on. After the accident 
he underwent reconstructive surgery and remained disfigured, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder; he became 
depressed and his condition worsened over time, until, finally, he committed suicide nearly six years after the accident. The 
and considerably meaner when the claimant’s loss appears to be the result of 
the claimant’s own voluntary act, operating with a causation test based on the 
idea of a direct causal link between wrongful act and loss70, also used in French 
law, as we have seen. Without entering the age-old moral debate on whether or 
not we humans are free agents, we must accept the reality that the law 
presumes us to be so, and does give effect to our so-called free will to create 
rights and responsibilities, and also contribute through its exercise to our own 
losses, extinguishing or decreasing the responsibility of others that have also 
contributed to them. But the law also acknowledges the effect of external 
compulsion on a person in exercising their freedom of will, when such 
compulsion is physical/psychological (duress) or even economic. And 
compulsion in deciding to incur expense may not just be 
physical/psychological/economic, but also legal, for example, security 
expenditure required by insurance. This could be seen as close to an objective 
constraint on the claimant’s free will as it can get, and could provide enough 
evidence of expenditure attributed to an event outside the claimant’s control. 
To reach a conclusion, Dummett’s criteria are specifically intended to explain 
causation empirically, not scientifically. Moreover, in an age where quantum 
physics has demonstrated that anything is scientifically possible in nature, 
Dummett’s criteria offer a pragmatic understanding of causation and can be 
applied to human acts without serious difficulty. However, even if factual 
causation could thus be established, the question of how far the wrongdoer 
should be held responsible for advance precautionary expenditure71 remains an 
important issue of legal policy. And causation is as much an area of legal policy 
as it is, or should be, of philosophical or scientific speculation72. If advance 
                                                          
House of Lords rejected the claim by the company that the suicide was a novus actus interveniens, breaking the chain of 
causation between the accident and the death. In another case, Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd, 2008 WL 678097 (Ch.D), 
(2008) 105 LSG 28, [2008] EWHC 454, concerning a claim by a gambling loser that the bookmaker owed him a duty of care 
as a problem gambler and that the duty was breached with the bookmaker’s failure to comply with a request to exclude the 
gambler from gambling, the Chancery Court held that only exceptional circumstances could give rise to a Common Law duty 
of care to prevent or to mitigate the consequences or aggravation of self-inflicted harm, but, in rejecting the gambler’s claim, 
left those circumstances undefined, referring to the vague three stage test of foreseeability, proximity and fairness, introduced 
in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd (The Nicholas H) [1996] AC 211 HL and reinforced, with the addition 
of the requirement of voluntary assumption of responsibility, in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc 
[2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. The Court noted that the voluntary assumption test was most influential where the parties' 
relationship had the indicia of contract save for consideration. 
70 In Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 3 CMLR 31, the ECJ held (applying 
Herpels v Commission of the European Communities (C54/77) [1978] ECR 585 ECJ), that the causal link required under the 
EC Treaty (Amsterdam) Art. 288 for the civil liability of the EU Commission for an alleged wrongful act could only be 
established where the damage was the direct consequence of the wrongful act in question (see also P Dumortier Freres SA v 
Council of Ministers of the European Communities (64/76) (Liability) [1979] ECR 3091 ECJ and Societa Finanziaria 
Siderurgica Finsider SpA v Commission of the European Communities (C363/88) [1992] ECR I-359). It was the claimant’s 
own decision to seek legal advice when bringing complaints before the European Ombudsman against the Commission and 
the Commission could not be held liable for that decision. Accordingly, there was no causal link between the damage alleged, 
the claimant’s lawyers’ fees, and the original act of the Commission that had triggered the complaints. 
71 Pragmatism also dictates a realistic approach to the issue of whether wrongdoers, other, perhaps, than violators of musical 
copyright rights, can be expected to be solvent enough or to be liability-insured. 
72 “Courts of law must accept the fact that the philosophic doctrine of causation and the juridical doctrine of responsibility for 
the consequences of a negligent act diverge. To a philosopher – a term which I use in no disparaging sense, for what is a 
security expenditure qualifies as recoverable loss, what about the cost to the 
claimant of loss insurance against the risk of losses caused by wrongful acts such 
as the act of the defendant? It could be argued that in view of the fact that the 
claimant is allowed, under most systems, the windfall of tort damages and loss 
insurance payouts, if such insurance had been privately purchased, this would 
be taking the wrongdoer’s responsibility too far; but it might also be argued, 
from an economic deterrence perspective that the cost of such insurance, as 
indeed other, advance precautionary expenditure should be charged to the 
wrongdoer for maximum deterrence73. And from a corrective-justice 
perspective, is it not imperative that wrongdoers account for all losses and 
expenditure caused by their wrongful conduct? Admittedly, though, the moral 
case looks stronger in relation to advance security expenditure caused by the 
need to prevent intentional wrongful acts, such as shoplifting, or copyright 
violations, rather than merely negligent ones. 
 
                                                          
philosopher but one who, inter alia, reasons severely and with precision? – to a philosopher, the whole legal doctrine of 
responsibility must seem anomalous. To him, if event C could not occur unless each of two previous events – A and B – had 
preceded it, it would be unmeaning to say that A was more responsible for the occurrence of C than was B, or that B was more 
responsible for its occurrence than was A.” Per Lord Asquith of Bishop-stone in Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 
at 687. Commenting on this passage, Lord Hoffmann said: “Lord Asquith had been awarded firsts in Mods and Greats at 
Balliol, so he presumably knew what he was talking about. But the proposition seemed to mean that if someone buys a gun 
and shoots someone, a philosopher would say that it was “unmeaning” to treat the killer as more responsible for the victim’s 
death than the shopkeeper who sold the gun. At that point I thought that if this was philosophy, I was glad I was reading law”: 
“Causation”, 121 Law Quarterly Review 2003, 592, 593. 
73 On whether or not tort law can actually achieve economic deterrence see the masterful study of the late Garry Schwartz, 
“Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?”, in 42 UCLA Law Review, 376-444 (1994). 
